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ABSTRACT
Over the last decade, the number of small and medium (SME) busi-
nesses suffering data breaches has risen at an alarming rate. Know-
ing how to respond to inevitable data breaches is critically impor-
tant. A number of guidelines exist to advise organisations on the
steps necessary to ensure an effective incident response. These
guidelines tend to be unsuitable for SMEs, who generally have
limited resources to expend on security and incident responses.
Qualitative interviews were conducted with SMEs to probe cur-
rent data breach response practice and to gather best-practice advice
from SMEs themselves. The interviews revealed no widespread de
facto approach, with a variety of practices being reported. A number
of prevalent unhelpful-practice themes emerged from the responses,
which we propose specific mitigation techniques to address.
We therefore propose a SME-specific incident response frame-
work that is simple yet powerful enough to inform and guide SME
responses to data breach incidents.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber security has been identified as one of six Tier 1 threats to
national security. It is estimated that it will cost the UK up to £27
bn per year [29]. Annually, it is reported by industry white papers
[21, 55] that the number of data breaches is rising [23]. Attacks are
also becoming increasingly sophisticated.
Small organisations (SMEs) are not immune to being targeted by
hackers [20]. SMEs cannot expect to avoid detection or attacks due
to their small size. Indeed, Krebs [35] reports that they are increas-
ingly the prime target. It is essential that they plan for, respond to,
recover and learn from hacking attacks [48, p. 131].
On the other hand, it is infeasible for SMEs to follow advice
given to larger organisations. Incident response advice is rarely
tailored to an organisation’s needs, nor does it acknowledge organ-
isation size and resources [17, 41]. A number of general standards
and guidelines have been published to inform business incident re-
sponses [13, 22, 32, 43] but they are extensive and attempt to cover
all bases. For example, the Experian guide to dealing with data
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breaches [22] has 31 pages and makes frequent reference to “upper
management”. The Data Breach Response Checklist, published by
the US government [43], refers to the role of Human Resources
and having a ‘response team’. Their advice is also extensive and
comprehensive, spanning 8 pages. The ICO data security breach
management guide [31] also makes reference to Human Resources
and IT teams, and having ‘technical’ and ‘non-technical’ staff to
assist in the development of recovery plans. These data breach
response guides, while certainly exemplary and helpful to large
organisations, are not practical for SMEs to follow, especially those
at the smaller end in terms of numbers of employees.
The situation for SMEs, at present, is that the consequences of a
data breach could be bankruptcy [11]. Yet they are simply not in a
position to hire and maintain security staff to take care of this the
way big organisations can, nor, in many cases, can they afford to
outsource their data breach response.
The European Union’s GDPR regulation is coming into force in
May 2018 and applies to all organisations regardless of size [16].
This is going to force organisations to contemplate their data breach
response strategies [10]. SMEs need simple and clear guidelines
for responding and meeting the requirements of the new law. Not
doing so could make them go out of business or risk breaking the
law.
We carried out research to develop an SME-specific incident
response framework that was simple enough for SMEs to follow, yet
powerful enough to be fit for purpose. The framework we developed
is less comprehensive than the general guidelines published by
respected bodies, but still covers the legally mandated aspects of a
breach response. Moreover, it has been deliberately simplified for
use by a non-expert and/or non-technical SME owner. Elements
have been incorporated specifically to address typical panicked
reactions such as overly technical and unthinking responses, and to
encourage the development and maintenance of an organisational
memory to ensure that SMEs develop personal best practice in
terms of breach responses.
2 BEST PRACTICE INCIDENT RESPONSE
We commenced with a literature review in order to inform the
formulation of the interview questions we were going to ask our
SME respondents.
Academic literature has seen some focus on incident handling
within SMEs [26]. Despite this step in the right direction, concrete
research has yet to come up with a widely-agreed SME-specific
incident response framework.
Several incident response frameworks and guides have emerged
from industry [13, 32], government [28, 40] and academia [38, 44].
American standards bodies, such as NIST [13] and CREST [14], also
provide helpful guidance. Most demarcate the following distinct
incident response stages:
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Preparation: the first step and involves organisations readying
themselves for an incident through establishment or preparation of
an internal information security incident response team (CSIRT).
Verification: ‘detection or reporting of security incidents within
an organisation’ [25, p. 32].
Containment: this might involve isolating the systems, chang-
ing passwords and disabling accounts, depending on the vulnera-
bility that was exploited.
Eradication: organisations seek to eliminate the components of
an incident with a focus on the restoration of systems [34] through
actions including; identification of affected hosts, conducting mal-
ware and forensics analysis.
Recovery: taking actions such as: continuous testing and veri-
fication coupled with using back-ups to restore systems to normal
business operations.
Follow-up: activity such as holding a post-incident meeting to
explore actions that were taken and considering how effective they
were. What could be done differently next time? Answers should
feed back into organisational practices through the establishment of
new controls, procedures and policies [37, 59]. However, as Jaatun
et al.’s [33] study of the petroleum industry shows, in practice,
challenges often arise which makes learning lessons difficult.
3 INTERVIEWING SMES
Ethical approval was sought and granted for interviewing SMEs, see
below.We crafted a set of questions to explore SMEs’ understanding
of data breaches and their extant practice with respect to incident
responses. We decided to carry out semi-structured interviews so
that we had the flexibility to explore their responses further and
elicit valuable insights from them.
We thus commenced with a pre-defined set of questions (see
Appendix A) then explored their responses, changing ordering and
exploring particular issues they raised [42].
We targeted SMEs, and specifically SME employees who were
responsible for Information Security. Participants were recruited
via convenience sampling and word-of-mouth. Due to difficulties
in recruiting SMEs to participate, we switched to asking them to
participate in order to recommend best responses to breaches. This
helped us in terms of recruiting, since they were no longer con-
cerned about admitting to being breached themselves.
3.1 Carrying out the Interviews
In Summer 2017, we carried out semi-structured interviews with
organisations to explore current practice and to gather advice from
11 respondents [30]. We explored three particular topics:
(1) Understanding: of what the term “data breach” meant [52,
53],
(2) Current Practice: what they currently did with respect to
preparing for, and responding to, data breaches [25, 38], and
(3) Best Practice Advice what they would advise other organi-
sations like themselves to do with respect to managing data breach
incidents (to allow them to feel that they were contributing to
compiling ‘good practice’ for the benefit of other SMEs).
3.2 Results
(1) Data Breach Understanding. When asked to define the term
“data breach”, participants used phrases similar to: ‘it involves un-
intended disclosure or access of information’. Some also highlighted
the difference between a security incident and data breach saying
‘security incidents are sort of a wider ranging term, for instance you
could have an incident with cloud technologies or networks, breaches
would kind of be more concerned with data’.
(2) Current Practice.
Preparation:
All participants explained that preparation before a data breach was
crucial. Only two participants had no formal preparation in place
because ‘we don’t know how and what to plan for. . . . plus, we have
an IT supplier!’ When asked which actions should be prioritised
during preparation one explained, ‘establishing and preparing; the
CISO’ others proposed, ‘establishing who to contact’. Participants
who reported to having a CSIRT explained that preparation should
focus on ‘fully equipping the CSIRT’.
Participants 11 and 5 outlined the importance of rehearsal stat-
ing, ‘plans should be war gamed annually’. Levels of rehearsal varied,
with participant 5 explaining that their plan is practiced ‘in anger
on a daily basis’. On the other hand, Participant 2 reported ‘I don’t
think the plan is practiced at all!’. A number of participants reported
having plans in place but also admitted that ‘we have a plan . . .
whether we follow that every time (we respond) I am not sure’.
Verification:
All interviewees explained that an immediate first step when re-
sponding to breaches is acting on manual and automatic reports.
Participant 2 explained ‘after the report, the first thing we did was to
take steps to verify that it was indeed a data breach’ and Participant
4 said that, they also ‘identified [the] nature of the attack by trying
to understand the potential impact and damage caused’.
When asked who should react first to these alerts, those handling
externally, such as Participant 3, explained that the external party
needs to react first as ‘information security incidents are handled,
verified and coordinated through an external source’. Participants
handling internally echoed the views of Participant 6 who explained
that verification is conducted by ‘the person or teammost appropriate
to respond’.
Interviewees also explained that during verification, forensic
and technical tools were used, with Participant 6 stating ‘identify
the incident and detect possibly via SIEM tools’. Some participants
explained that once a data breach had been verified, forensic triage
was to be completed. At this point Participant 10 added that, ‘if
you’ve verified a data breach, identify whether stolen data was en-
crypted or non-encrypted’.
Containment:
Respondents explained that actions to contain breaches came next,
with Participant 9 explaining actions focused on, ‘ensuring that
the outflow of data has been stemmed’. Participant 7, further stated
‘containment depends on the type of incident that has occurred ... let’s
say a phishing email came through, you could take some quick steps ...
However, with ‘WannaCry’ we had to take more serious action’. Dur-
ing containment, common actions included isolation by ‘Taking the
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server offline cut all ties to isolate it from the network.’ ‘changing all
passwords’. Participant 10 even mentioned, ‘Carry on! Some people
will say isolate until you’ve fixed it — well the answer is, don’t’.
Participants also emphasised the importance of communication
which some referred to ‘contacting senior management to let them
know what had happened . . . to get their permission to take servers of-
fline.’ and for others referred to getting, ‘Legal and PR involved’. For
participant 3, external communication was key as they explained
‘we have contractual arrangements with many external suppliers’.
Interviewees also echoed the views of Participant 4 who said, ‘de-
pendent on the type of attack, we may have to contact authorities
(ICO)’.
Recovery:
Participants described a recovery stage where, similar to Partic-
ipant 9, actions focused on, ‘restoring the integrity of the hacked
system’ through the prioritisation of technical actions because as
Participant 6 explained, ‘technical changes are the quickest to im-
plement for recovery. They may be a blunt instrument to address the
problem but may be necessary’. Participant 5 also suggested if a
breach ‘results in a loss of system operation, then ideally recovery of
systems from a recent backup’. Meanwhile, Participant 7 pointed out
that, ‘sometimes recovery from these things can be much bigger’ and
others such as Participant 2 even said, ‘I have no idea the IT and
technical guys took care of the recovery’.
Follow-up:
All interviewees pointed out that learning lessons during the follow
up stage and implementing these lessons back into practice after a
breach would lead to improvements in the response process and
prevent future attacks from happening. Despite this, there was an
inconsistent and unreliable execution of lessons learnt in practice.
Participant 7, explained that, their organisation prioritised ‘contin-
uous application of lessons learnt and proactively apply best practice’.
Others said implementing lessons learnt is difficult because ‘events
are rapidly forgotten, as business priorities change security concerns
drift back towards the bottom of the pile’.
Participants expressed ‘lessons should be learnt through organi-
sational changes including, ‘security policy revision’, ‘security culture
change’, ‘user training’ and, ‘changing passwords’. A large number of
interviewees also focused on technical changes such as ‘changing
firewall rules’, ‘deploying canary/honeypot devices’.
(3) Best Practice Advice
Locate assets:
Interviewees advised that each individual organisation needed to
understand what it’s ‘crown jewels’ are by asking questions such
as; ‘What issues are created by the compromise of data in an or-
ganisation?’ so that they can use this information ‘to potentially
work out plans of what to do when people actually come after them’.
Participant 7 provided an example of this and explained, ‘if we
lost 50 email addresses and phone numbers it’s not ideal but may be
catastrophic for others. However, if we lost 2 million customer records
—- that’s catastrophic for us’.
Prioritise security:
Participant 2 expressed views held by others, stating, ‘first things
first: you need to establish a mind-set where you expect to be breached’.
Interviewees stated that, by so doing, organisations could priori-
tise security concerns and ‘engender a culture of security within the
workforce: both at work and within private lives’.
Simplify:
Participant 9 and others advised organisations to, ‘boil security down
to the simple things’. Participant 3 gave examples of simple solutions
stating, ‘ensure the IT you are using is protected by the latest versions
of hardware and software —- saving by using old technology is false
economy’.
People are important:
Participants said: ‘cyber-threats are often seen too narrowly as a
technical issue. In fact cyber-security depends on the right approaches
to technology, but also personnel’ .
Participants advised, ‘It is essential to establish open and clear
communication networks with staff, senior management and third
parties’. Others also advised open and constant communication with
‘affected customers’, ‘external bodies’ and ‘external incident handling
parties’.
Need for Measured Action:
Respondents explained that it was essential for organisations to
document every action. Participant 2 said this was because ‘you
need to have evidence of all the actions you’ve taken’. Participant 6
advised that, to comply with this, ‘organisations should have tools
in place to gather information, before the incident takes place’.
Interviewees encouraged organisations to seek external support
before a breach from ‘The National Cyber Security Centre’ and
by ‘hiring security professionals’. Others stated that seeking help
during the incident was vital in order to contain the breach, with
Participant 10 explaining ‘if a breach is verified bring in expertise
very quickly to act upon the problem’.
Interviewees urged organisations to ‘report breaches of personal
data to the ICO and to become aware of important regulation such as
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)’ [31].
3.3 Limitations
A limitation of this research is that the sample is not large enough
to be fully representative of the views of the general population.
This is due to the fact that many organisations do not want to speak
about such a sensitive topic. Only eleven of the 100+ organisations
we contacted were willing to be interviewed. It was only when we
switched the focus, from speaking about their own data breach
responses, to eliciting advice for others that we were able speak to
eleven SMEs. Still, we have to acknowledge this as a limitation and
we hope to be able to find a better way to recruit participants in
the future.
4 REFLECTION
It is clear that the SMEs we spoke to define and interpret data
breaches similarly and are aware of what the data breach meant.
As a consequence, they could outline which actions needed to be
prioritised during the preparation and follow-up stage. Compared
to the unawareness reported by Line et al. [53] and Tan et al. [52],
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these results are somewhat unexpected, but gratifying. It could be a
consequence of the intervening years having raised the prominence
of data breaches in themedia. This is further evidenced by theMarsh
Report [36, p. 2] which reports that levels of basic or complete
organisational understanding of cyber-risk rose from 60.8% in 2015
to 83.8% in 2016.
A number of insights emerged from our interviews, which we
highlight here in order to inform our development of a framework
to help SMEs to respond to breaches.
(1)Over-Emphasis on TechnicalMeasures. Results from the
interviews show that throughout the breach response process or-
ganisations displayed a disposition for implementing technical mea-
sures over non-technical ones. Moreover, in scenarios where or-
ganisations could not execute the measures themselves, technical
expertise and solutions were prioritised. These results are unsur-
prising as they lend weight to the arguments presented by Shedden
et al. [48] that organisations prioritise the use of technical measures
because they believe data breaches are, by definition, a technical
problem which demands a technical solution.
One participant said: ‘technical changes are the quickest to im-
plement for recovery. They may be a blunt instrument to address the
problem but may be necessary.’ There was little reference to staff
training or to the role of the human element in improving resilience
to future attacks. Only in the follow-up section was this mentioned
but this seemedmore of a wish list than something that was actually
implemented.
Best practice advice also makes a specific recommendation about
technical aspects, but says little about awareness training for staff.
They refer to a culture of security but don’t say how this ought to
be achieved.
This confirms reports from other researchers about incident
responses appearing to place an unrealistic ‘emphasis on technical
competence in responding to incidents’ [48, p. 133].
(2) Unthinking Responses. The best practice responses high-
light the fact that preparation and a realistic expectation of being
breached is important, in terms of knowing where assets are, and
prioritising security.
Yet, in the responses about extant practice, there was some ev-
idence that people would respond without really checking that
the response would address the source of the breach. For example,
requiring all staff to change their passwords before it has been
confirmed that the attack vector involved a leaked password im-
poses significant burdens on staff without necessarily addressing
the source of the breach.
The SMEs find it difficult to execute what they propose in theory
throughout the entire data breach event. For example, during the
preparation and follow up stages, organisations outline the impor-
tance of having plans in place and of learning lessons. However,
in reality, organisations reported not using or ignoring existing
plans during a breach and found learning lessons difficult after
because of: a lack of expertise, lack of resources and skills to imple-
ment ideas in practice. This resulted in actions being designated to
more skilled individuals, and the organisation’s failure to prioritise
cyber-security.
These results confirm research by Hove et al. [30] and Jaatun et
al. [33] who found that organisations have incident response plans
in place but that, in practice, these procedures were not well estab-
lished. However, whilst current studies outline how organisations
experience difficulties implementing theory into practice during
each individual step of incident response, this research confirms
that these trends are still evident throughout the entire breach
response process.
This all points to a hasty and unmeasured response to data
breaches, which means SMEs run the risk of carrying out the wrong
actions and not dealing appropriately with breaches. Ineffective
responses can have negative consequences. A prime example is
UK telecoms company TalkTalk which lost an estimated 157000
customers’ personal data [19]. The BBC reports that breaches at
TalkTalk have cost the company up to £35 million in damages [8].
(3) Lessons are not Learned. Our interviews revealed an in-
consistent and unreliable execution of lessons learnt. Some par-
ticipants were indeed aware of the value of such an activity but
pointed out the difficulties of doing this in the general melee of
business life.
Researchers have highlighted the importance of a follow-up stage
where lessons are learned to be commonplace within organisations
[37, 59]. However, as Jaatun et al.’s [33] study of the petroleum
industry shows, and we confirm, in practice challenges often arise
that makes learning lessons difficult, and this deters their ability to
respond to future incidents more effectively [3, p. 651].
5 MITIGATIONS
In proposing the mitigations we were mindful of the fact that SMEs
have limited resources. In a more resource-rich organisation, these
problems could be solved by hiring extra staff, or by contracting an
external company to deal with any breaches that do occur. SMEs
often do not have the luxury of these solutions. Hence we pro-
posed mitigations here that would not require major expense and
would essentially simplify the process. The main aim was to make
it more manageable for solo responders who were not necessarily
information security experts.
(1) Over-Emphasis on Technical Responses. Organisations
believe that paying more attention to the human element i.e. hav-
ing the right people in place before the breach, and working with
individuals after the breach, is vitally important. These findings are
interesting because, in practice, organisations prioritised technical
measures, but when giving best practice advice there was an em-
phasis on prioritising measures addressing users. These findings
lend support to research by Adams and Sasse [1] which promoted
focus on the increasing importance of human elements within
cyber-security research.
Incident response has to be holistic, addressing technical, man-
agerial, legal and human aspects of information security [18]. The
emphasis on technical responses is probably due to a measure of
panic. Incident response is a stressful experience and Von Lubitz
et al. [56] explain that, ‘stress has a demonstrable negative effect
on human information processing and interactions with chaotic
environments’.
In helping SMEs to mitigate this tendency we are suggesting the
use of checklists, commonly used in the medical field. Checklists
providing easy-to-follow instructions to manage complex processes
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[24, p. 120]. This technique, we believe, will be useful because
the medical environment is also stressful and checklists might well
benefit information security as much as it has been shown to benefit
medical procedures by preventing omissions and thereby saving
lives.
Gawande [24, p. 49] argues that checklists are an effective tool
in these kinds of situations because they ‘do not try to spell out
everything’ but instead act as a guide by providing reminders of
only ‘the most critical and important steps’ [24, p. 120].
The Alien Vault’s incident response guide [5, p. 21] argues that
emergency contact checklists are valuable for maintaining commu-
nication with all the relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, checklists
can also help maintain a paper trail during the breach because [34].
For SMEs, having checklists that encode essential incident re-
sponse plans in an easy-to-process format constitutes an inexpen-
sive way to provide valuable, structured and easy-to-understand
guidance. This ‘can prove highly beneficial as they can help ensure
that personnel take prompt, consistent and holistic action under
less than ideal conditions’ [39]. The core plans that need to be
encoded into checklists are [2, 49]: (1) Disaster Recovery Plan, (2)
Crisis Communication Plan, and (3) Business Continuity Plan.
(2) Unthinking Responses. When an organisation has been
breached, both ‘co-ordination and timing’ become serious concerns
[24, p. 49]. To mitigate this, John Boyd’s OODA loop, used exten-
sively in the military, can prove beneficial because it ‘provides the
essential framework for knowledge-based multidimensional critical
thinking and rapid decision-making’ [56].
OODA has four stages: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. Observe
refers to actively absorbing the entire environment and changes
that ‘identify anomalous behaviour that may require investigation’
[5, p. 18]. In the context of data breach response, responders will
ask themselves key questions such as; ‘What’s normal activity on
my network?’ the better to understand the attack [46].
Orient is when information and knowledge gathered during
Observe is broken down and assessed to introduce ‘the first steps
needed to re-organise it into the pre-disaster configuration’ [56, p.
571].
The third stage isDecide, which refers to the responder defining
‘the nature and characteristics of the action(s) to be taken’ [56, p.
343]. In the context of incident response, responders assess different
options obtained during the orientation stage to hypothesise the
best course of action which ensures the ‘fastest recovery’ [5, p. 19].
The fourth stage is Act and refers to testing the proposed hy-
pothesis made in the previous stage, to remediate and recover [5,
p. 20] back online. The Act section is not the final part of the loop
because the feedback from the action taken will form the basis of
the next cycle of the loop.
For SMEs, using theOODA loopwhen responding to data breaches
requires them to observe first, then orient and decide before they
act. This, together with the checklists, ought to ensure a measured
and more effective response to the breach.
(3) Lessons are not Learned. Current incident response frame-
works, both in industry and academia [13, 53], perceive incident
response cyclically i.e. a feedback-enabled lessons-learned loop
feeding into the next incident response in order to improve the
effectiveness of the responses.
The best way to do this is firstly to maintain a “lessons learned”
database. The lessons learned, or known errors, database is a com-
monly used measure in organisations [54]. Sharif et al. [47] argue
that it is critical for tacit knowledge be shared within organisa-
tions. In the context of incident response, the SME-specific incident
response framework needs deliberately to incorporate a feedback
loop, as originally proposed by Beer [9], to keep such a database
current and helpful.
Other researchers in information security have argued for the
need to learn lessons from data breach incident responses [3, 12,
27, 45]. Making such a feedback loop explicit in the framework
will help to remind SMEs of the need to examine and learn from
incident responses after the event.
This loop, together with the use of checklists to encode essential
actions, make it easier to incorporate lessons learned into a simple,
usable, and systematic form [24].
6 AN SME-SPECIFIC INCIDENT RESPONSE
FRAMEWORK
SMEs need to develop a mind-set whereby a breach is expected at
any time, and plan accordingly. The framework we suggest here
incorporates the essential requirements of the GDPR, incorporated
into checklists, and moderated by applying OODA instead of leap-
ing in, in a panic.
Those actions that are required by GDPR are marked as such.
The other items have been added specifically to help SMEs, miti-
gating their resource limitations. Although they have been marked
as SME-Specific they would be helpful for large organisations too,
but might not be necessary
Before the Breach
• GDPR — Identify Business-Critical Resources and Sensitive
Information: Identify the ‘crown jewels’ (business-critical
systems and personal customer information) to establish
which areas need focused attention.
• GDPR — Be Aware of Regulations: The new GDPR regulations
have to be complied with. Organisations have to ensure that
they are aware of their responsibilities before any incident
occurs. SMEs must familiarise themselves with the relevant
notification regulations.
• SME-Specific — Seek External Advice & Support: Seek exter-
nal support and knowledge from government initiatives and
freely available advice guides. Boil security down to the sim-
plest things. For example, implement the H.M Government
‘Cyber Essentials’ as a starting point [15].
• GDPR — Assign Response Roles: Decide if it is beneficial for
cyber-security matters to be handled in-house or externally.
By doing this, roles and responsibilities are clearly defined.
• SME-Specific—Develop Checklists to guide Incident Response:
Compile checklists to help responders recall essential infor-
mation regarding organisational processes. It is vital that
three plans are encoded into checklists [2, 49]: (1) Disas-
ter Recovery Plan, (2) Crisis Communication Plan, and (3)
Business Continuity Plan.
• GDPR — Carry out Security Awareness Training: The employ-
ees of an organisation are an essential link in the information
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security chain. Conducting regular awareness training is the
only way to increase their resilience.
During the Breach Response
• SME-Specific — (OODA) Observe, Orient, Decide, then Act:
First, Observe: Responders gather information from the inci-
dent environment. Second, Orient: Responders use informa-
tion gathered to prioritise response actions. Third, Decide:
Responders use knowledge to hypothesise the best course of
action to effectively respond to a breach. Finally, Follow the
Disaster Recovery Plan: Now, follow the checklist developed
during the preparation phase.
• GDPR — Document all Actions, with Timeline: Checklists
should be used to prompt responders regarding key processes
and also to document every action taken. A paper trail is
crucial.
• GDPR — Report the Breach to the Supervisory Authority: This
must be done within 72 hours.
• GDPR — Follow the Crisis Communication Plan: Maintain
communication with important internal stakeholders, re-
gardless of whether the breach is being handled internally
or externally. Employees are also stakeholders [7].
• SME-Specific — Summon External Incident Response Sup-
port if Required: If a breach is being handled internally and
overwhelms resources use emergency external professional
support.
After the Breach Response
• GDPR — Reflect on Lessons Learned: Irrespective of internal
or external handling of breaches, evaluate the experience
and ask questions such as: “What could be done better?”
• GDPR — Feed Lessons back into Checklists: Transform the
main takeaways from the evaluation to refine the: (1) Disas-
ter Recovery Plan, (2) Crisis Communication Plan, and (3)
Business Continuity Plan.
• GDPR — Boost Security Awareness: Use the breach to boost se-
curity awareness and encourage individuals to learn lessons
proactively through open forums.
• SME-Specific — Do not Neglect the Humans: Security is not
just about technical measures. Work with and educate em-
ployees across the organisation regarding security using free
advice e.g. H.M Government ‘Cyber Essentials’.
6.1 Expert Review Feedback
Following ethical approval, see below, we sent the previous list
of recommendations to four security experts. We asked them for
feedback so that we could refine the recommendations
(1) ‘I love where you are going with this. You need to get organ-
isations into a state of preparedness by asking: Is it important to
your business if someone can get into your computer and steal your
customer information?
(2) ‘These are implementable, and scalable, you could strengthen
them further by encouraging organisations to devote some effort to
situational awareness – Is somebody responsible for understanding
what sorts of threats are out there? The recent NHS malware incident
is, a good example. Did the average organisation cotton on to that,
and take precautionary steps?’
(3) ‘There is very little improvement, just more expansion is needed.
The term ‘crown jewels’ refers to any business-critical systems the
organisation relies on that would have a significant detrimental im-
pact should they be unavailable. Look at other regulation such as:
The NIS Directive and PECR. Organisations should seek to incor-
porate lessons learnt into the organisation’s security awareness
programmes, for key incidents such as WannaCry, conduct ‘ask me
anything’ type awareness-raising sessions allowing employees to
understand more about these types of incident.
(4) ‘It looks good, you could put a bit about policies and feeding
lessons learned back into policy’
Based on this feedback, the final incident response framework is
presented in Figure 1, and Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Final Incident Response Plan
7 DISCUSSION
The SMEs who participated in our study were well aware of data
breaches, an improvement since 2003 [52]. Many were also aware
of the fact that they ought to have some kind of plan in place to
deal with any data breaches that did occur.
There was no broad agreement with respect to what the response
to incidents ought to be. For example, during Containment, organi-
sations discussed a variety of different actions with some suggesting
isolating systems and others disagreeing with this approach. This
confirms Grispos [25] assertions about the variability of incident
responses. Morever, despite a general awareness that something
ought to be done, and plans to lay down what the reaction should
be, it did not seem that they tested or followed their plans when
the need arose. This disconnect between awareness and action has
already been commented on by other researchers [4].
We identified three particular themes that seemed to be getting
in the way of SMEs responding as effectively as possible to data
breaches, quite apart from their size and limited resources.
The first, an over-emphasis on technical security measures, was
raised by Von Solms and Von Solms [57] in 2004, more than a decade
ago and confirmed by [3]. It is disappointing to find that this kind
of myopic focus is still prevalent in industry in 2017, when an
increasing focus on the human’s role in information security is
becoming accepted by industry [1, 6, 51].
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Figure 2: SME-Specific Incident Response Framework
(G=GDPR-Required Response)
The second problem is that organizations struggle to respond
in a measured way. In our discussions with participants about
containment it was obvious that they did not really respond in a
consistent way. This is understandable because people are going to
be stressed by the event [50, 58].
The third problem is that SMEs did not seem to have amechanism
for learning lessons from previous data breach events and responses.
The framework we propose specifically addresses each of these
problems, using techniques that have proven successful in other
disciplines: checklists (medicine) [24], OODA (the USA Military)
[56] and an institutional lessons-learned archive resource (business
knowledge management) [47, 54].
8 CONCLUSION
This paper set out to propose a feasible yet helpful framework to
inform SME incident responses to data breach responses.We carried
out a series of semi-structured interviews in order to inform the
development of this data breach response framework. This SME-
specific framework is different from others because it incorporates
successful techniques from medicine (checklists) and the military
(OODA), and explicitly incorporates a feedback loop to ensure that
lessons are learned over the lifetime of an organisation. It is also
relatively simple and not as heavy-weight as other best practice
recommendations aimed at more resource-rich organisations.
This framework is not intended to be the final version. It clearly
needs to be used “in anger” by SMEs and refined and improved
based on their experiences. We present it here in order to gain
feedback from other researchers. We hope to find SMEs who are
willing to trial the framework and we hope thereby to refine it
until it starts becoming a helpful resource. We believe that our
deployment of proven techniques from other disciplines will prove
helpful in incident responses too.
Our long-term aim is to support SMEs more effectively in coping
with data breaches in the face of the coming GDPR legislation.
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9 APPENDIX A
1. What company do you work for? (if you prefer not to be identified then
anonymity will be respected)
2. What is your role in the company?
3. What does the term data breach mean to you?
4. Have you had any security breaches within your organisation? (if you
prefer not answer then skip to question 6)
a. If yes, can you describe the breach? (i.e. DDOS) . . . .
b. How did you detect the breach? – what methods were used? (automatic
or manual?)
c. How did you follow up the event, was the breach investigated? If so
d. Does your organisation have an incident response plan to use in case you
get hacked?
If you have a plan –is it rehearsed,
If yes, how often, and what sort of vulnerabilities does it cover?)
5. Do you have a CSIRT team –
If yes, how does the team prepare?
if no team or plan – then why not?
6. Say you experience a hacking event. Could you say how you think you
should respond?
7. Who should react first?
8. What actions should be taken to recover from the breach?
9. What actions should be prioritised?
What General Advice would you give to other companies?
1. What would be your top three incident response tips for an organisation
that has suffered a breach?
2. How would you simplify the process of incident response?
3. How should lessons be learnt?
4. How could we ensure that companies can learn from attacks?
5. How do you think events could change security attitudes within your
organisation?
6. How important do you think preparation and having a pre-determined
plan is in terms of being able to deal with a breach?
